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18. 
Science and the Eighth Amendment 
Meghan J. Ryan* 
 
As time hurtles forward, new science constantly emerges, and many scientific fields can 
shed light on whether a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, or even on whether 
bail or fines are unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. In fact, in recent years, 
science has played an increasingly important role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
From the development of an offender’s brain, to the composition of lethal injection drugs, even to 
measurements of pain, knowledge of various scientific fields is becoming central to understanding 
whether a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. There are a number of limits to how 
the Court can weave science into its decisions, though. For example, relevant data are difficult to 
come by, as ethical limitations prevent a wide swath of focused research that could be useful in 
this arena. Further, the Justices’ understandings of the complicated science that can help inform 
their Eighth Amendment decisions are limited. This chapter examines the relevance and limitations 
of science—both physical and social—in Eighth Amendment analyses. 
 
Eighth Amendment Doctrine 
The Eighth Amendment’s meaning and applications continually evolve. As the plurality in 
Trop v. Dulles1 explained, “the words of the Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not 
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static.”2 Instead, “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”3 To measure the existing standards of decency at 
any particular point in time, courts have traditionally examined both objective and subjective 
indicia.  
The primary objective indicium of decency is jurisdictions’ legislation. In other words, 
how many jurisdictions have adopted the practice at issue, and how many have rejected it? Also 
relevant is how often juries and judges have actually imposed the punishment in practice. 
Occasionally, the Court has suggested that examining opinion polls, the opinions of professional 
organizations, and foreign law could also play into an objective assessment of a punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment.4  
As for a subjective assessment of the current standards of decency, the Court has taken it 
upon itself to bring its own independent judgment to bear. In examining this question, the Court 
has primarily looked at whether the punishment serves retributive and deterrent purposes. For 
example, where offenders suffering from intellectual disabilities are facing capital punishment, the 
Court has found that they are less culpable and less deterrable than other individuals without 
intellectual disabilities, rendering them ineligible for the ultimate punishment.5 In more recent 
cases, though, the Court has examined other considerations, such as whether the punishment serves 
the goal of rehabilitation. In Graham v. Florida,6 for example, the Court found that it is 
unconstitutional to impose the punishment of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) on 
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juvenile offenders who committed nonhomicide offenses in large part because “the penalty 
forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”7 
Over time, the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment has changed, just as the 
plurality dictated in Trop. Jurisdictions’ laws change with citizens’ and lawmakers’ views of 
punishment.8 Perhaps the citizenry—whether influenced by religion, the media, politicians, or 
something else—have determined that a punishment is just too cruel to be imposed any longer. Or 
perhaps a jurisdiction has moved away from a particular punishment simply because it has proved 
to be too expensive—just as New Jersey abolished capital punishment in large part because of the 
exorbitant costs associated with it.9  
At the same time, the frequency with which sentencers impose a particular punishment can 
vary over time. Maybe the nature of offenses has shifted. Perhaps the values and identities of 
judges and juries have changed. Regardless, as the laws and sentences change, this shapes the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. In addition to 
laws and sentences changing, the ways in which the Court applies its independent judgment 
changes as new Justices fill Supreme Court seats and even as long-term Justices’ ideals change 
with greater experience. These fluctuations, too, shape the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 
Another important change agent is science. As more data about how jurisdictions 
implement punishments and how punishments affect offenders (and perhaps even other 
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individuals)10 become available, citizens’, juries’, and judges’ opinions about punishment may 
change. If, for example, new neuroscientific evidence were to make clear that a criminal action 
were the result of a physical abnormality in one’s brain rather than the product of an offender’s 
free will, many individuals might find it unjust—even cruel and unusual—to punish that individual 
with as harsh of a sentence as would ordinarily apply, or perhaps even to punish that individual at 
all. Or, if it becomes clear based on new science that, for example, current methods of execution 
create a significant amount of excruciating pain that is avoidable by employing an alternative 
method, then current Eighth Amendment doctrine would suggest that the punishment is 
unconstitutional.11  
 
Science, the Offender, and Punishment 
New science is likely to have an effect on punishments under the Eighth Amendment in at 
least two categories. First, this new information could provide insight on what types of offenders 
are eligible for particular punishments. Second, the information could spur innovations in 
punishment and also provide greater understanding about how punishments affect those being 
punished, which could bear on the acceptability of the punishments.  
 
Offender Characteristics 
The Supreme Court has long worried about how the state of one’s mind relates to 
punishment. In Ford v. Wainwright,12 the Court chronicled the history of the prohibition on 
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executing “insane” persons, finding that “[t]he bar against executing a prisoner who has lost his 
sanity bears impressive historical credentials” and explaining that “the practice consistently has 
been branded ‘savage and inhuman.’”13 Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Ford Court found that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the practice. Although the historical reasons for the ban are not 
entirely clear, the Eighth Amendment prohibition is grounded in the idea that an offender should 
understand what is happening to him and why.14 And “insanity” could very well prevent an 
offender from understanding the details of his execution and also why he is being put to death.  
Over the years, the Court has expanded the classes of persons who are not eligible for 
certain punishments. For example, in Atkins v. Virginia15 and Roper v. Simmons,16 the Court held 
that intellectually disabled persons and juvenile offenders cannot constitutionally be executed. And 
in Graham, the Court held that sentencers cannot constitutionally impose LWOP on juvenile non-
homicide offenders.17  
In supporting these conclusions, the Court has relied on society’s views of punishment 
through the measuring stick of the objective indicia of the standards of decency. It is not entirely 
clear why societal views of these punishments as related to these particular offenders changed, 
and, in fact, the Court has been accused of engaging in some creative accounting in concluding 
that a societal consensus had formed against these punishments. For example, in Atkins, Justice 
Scalia criticized the Court for “miraculously extract[ing] a ‘national consensus’ forbidding 
execution of the mentally retarded, from the fact that eighteen States—less than half (47%) of the 
 
13 Id. at 406. 
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thirty-eight States that permit capital punishment (for whom the issue exists)—have very recently 
enacted legislation barring execution of the mentally retarded.”18 He characterized this as 
“embarrassingly feeble evidence of ‘consensus.’”19 Despite any shortcomings in the Court’s 
assessment of the objective indicia of decency in these cases, a majority of the Court found the 
relevant changes in legislation, sentencing, and the like sufficiently persuasive. The majority thus 
moved on to the subjective assessment of decency, which the dissenters suggested was actually 
driving the Court’s conclusions in these cases anyway.  
Indeed, the Court’s views on the punishments in cases like Atkins, Roper, and Graham also 
had evolved such that the Court, in its own independent judgment, found the punishments 
unconstitutional. Some of this may be the result of shifting membership on the Court, but the Court 
(perhaps not surprisingly neglecting to acknowledge that Supreme Court decisions often follow 
popular opinion)20 has explained the changes by outlining how the various punishments no longer 
serve the relevant punishment goals. For example, in Roper and Atkins, the Court described how 
executing juveniles and intellectually disabled persons does not serve the punishment goals 
supporting the death penalty. It does not serve deterrence goals because these persons are generally 
less deterrable than the average person, and it does not serve retributive goals because these 
persons are generally less culpable than the average offender. In Graham, the Court explained that 
imposing the punishment of LWOP on juvenile non-homicide offenders similarly does not serve 
retribution or deterrence goals. Further, it is incompatible with incapacitation, and, probably most 
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importantly, undercuts rehabilitation because “[t]he penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal.”21 Certainly, new science did not establish that the purposes of punishment fail to support 
these particular punishments for these particular groups of offenders, but, by the time these cases 
were decided, there was evidence that these goals were weaker under these conditions. For 
example, deterrence theory depends on rational decision-making by would-be offenders, but, if 
these individuals’ decision-making is impaired—as the science suggests is often true for juveniles 
and intellectually disabled persons—then the deterrence rationale for punishment would be 
diminished in these circumstances. Accordingly, changing understandings about punishments’ 
effectiveness and offenders’ competency, culpability, and deterrability can very well shift the 
Court’s independent judgment about the constitutionality of a punishment.  
New science can contribute to our understandings about when offenders are unable to 
perceive what is happening to them and why, the extent to which particular offenders are less 
culpable than others, how deterrable certain offenders are, and the effectiveness of rehabilitation 
efforts. In some of its most recent cases, the Court has turned to the realms of psychology and 
neuroscience to further support the notion that some persons should not be not be subjected to 
particular punishments.22 For example, the Court’s decision in Roper points to the “scientific and 
social studies” that illustrate juveniles’ “lack of maturity” and “underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility.”23 It further refers to juveniles’ particular “vulnerab[ility] or susceptib[ility] to 
negative influences and outside pressures,”24 as well as the transitory, or unfixed nature, of their 
characters or personalities. These special juvenile characteristics established children as a unique 
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class requiring greater scrutiny and rendered juveniles ineligible for capital punishment. In 
Graham and Miller v. Alabama,25 the Court doubled down on its previous examination of juvenile 
brain development. In Graham, the Court explained that “developments in psychology and brain 
science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” such as the 
continued maturation of parts of “the brain involved in behavior control.”26 And in Miller, the 
Court recited the facts underlying Roper and Graham, explaining that these “decisions rested not 
only on common sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as 
well.”27 Moreover, the Miller Court noted that “[t]he evidence . . . indicate[d] that the science and 
social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions ha[d] become even stronger.”28 This 
led the Court to conclude that, even though mandatory sentences other than the death penalty are 
generally constitutional, mandatorily imposed LWOP sentences are impermissible for juveniles. 
Neuroscience, psychology, and other disciplines contributing to our understandings of 
competency, culpability, and deterrability often provide us with the possibility of individualized 
assessments, which can pose a challenge for existing Eighth Amendment doctrine. Although the 
Court has held that, at least to some extent, the Eighth Amendment requires individualized 
sentencing,29 the Court has been hesitant to strike down mandatory sentencing outside the capital 
context and has generally found Eighth Amendment relief for petitioners in only a categorical 
manner. For example, the Court has exempted a number of classes of individuals from capital 
punishment, and it has exempted juveniles from LWOP sentences, but the Court has generally not 
found long sentences or the death penalty to violate the Eighth Amendment as applied to a 
 
25 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
26 Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
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particular individual who was not part of a special class.30 Instead, as in Atkins, Roper, Graham, 
and Miller, the Court has exempted groups of offenders from punishments because of their class 
characteristics. This categorical approach to the Eighth Amendment could very well clash with the 
Court’s embrace of individualized scientific evidence about competency, culpability, and 
deterrability. The tension between the categorical approach and the use of individualized scientific 
evidence is apparent in Roper, where, although the Court exempted juveniles from capital 
punishment as a categorical matter, it acknowledged that this approach was subject to objections: 
“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 
eighteen. By the same token, some under eighteen have already attained a level of maturity some 
adults will never reach.”31 Nevertheless, the Court explained, “a line must be drawn.”32 If the Court 
continues ushering neuroscience, psychology, and other disciplines capable of individualized 
assessments of competency, culpability, and deterrability into its decision-making and opinions, it 
will need to more squarely confront the tension between the possibilities of improved accuracy by 
way of individualized determinations and the Court’s hesitancy to look at these issues on a case-
by-case basis. 
As a discipline, modern neuroscience is still in its infancy, and researchers have much to 
learn about brain development, abnormalities, and injuries. As we learn more about the human 
brain—how decisions are made and how brain capabilities and functions differ—this information 
could well be relevant to the competency, culpability, and deterrability concerns that the Court has 
expressed in its Eighth Amendment opinions. Some commentators are troubled by the possibility 
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that, as we continue to learn more about our brains, we could very well discover that criminal 
actions generally correspond with physical changes or differences in the brain. Indeed, some of 
the science suggests that it is the physical brain, rather than free will or the mind, that causes our 
actions and thus criminal behavior. For example, in 1983, Benjamin Libet et al. reported on their 
study showing that subjects’ brain activity associated with movement occurred several hundred 
milliseconds before they reported intending those movements.33 This finding was interpreted to 
prove that there is no free will—that the brain, rather than the mind, caused the movement.34 The 
study and its conclusions have since been roundly criticized, but this question about the existence 
and extent of free will remains. More recently, neuroscientists have been studying prisoners’ brains 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and have found aberrant brain activity in 
“criminal psychopaths,” suggesting that perhaps it was the offenders’ brains, not their minds, that 
caused them to commit criminal acts.35 Some commentators are concerned that this and similar 
findings could completely undermine the fundamental moral basis of criminal law that each of us 
has free will and should be held responsible for our actions.36 Other commentators are less 
concerned, concluding that the causation issue to which neuroscience is relevant—whether the 
 
33 See Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity 
(Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 623 (1983); see also 
Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE 
SCALES OF JUSTICE  169 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (stating that “Libet’s exceptionally creative and careful studies 
demonstrate that measurable electrical brain activity associated with intentional actions occurs about 550 
milliseconds before the subject actually acts, and for about 350–400 milliseconds before the subject is consciously 
aware of the intention to act”). 
34 See Libet et al., supra note 33, at 640–41 (suggesting that the evidence “would appear to introduce certain 
constraints on the potential of the individual for exerting conscious initiation and control over his voluntary acts”). 
35 See Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System 
Dysfunction, 142 PSYCHIATRY RES. 107 (2006); see also John Seabrook, Suffering Souls: The Search for the Roots 
of Psychopathy, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 2008. 
36 See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 
PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B 1775 (2004) (“Cognitive neuroscience, by identifying the specific mechanisms 
responsible for behaviour, will vividly illustrate what until now could only be appreciated through esoteric 
theorizing: that there is something fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and responsibility, and that, 
as a result, the legal principles we have devised to reflect these conceptions may be flawed.”). 





physical brain or rather free will caused the criminal behavior—is distinct from the responsibility 
issue on which the law is based.37 These are different views stemming from science’s suggestion 
that the culpability basis of criminal law may be eroding. But the science is not so clear. Often, 
neuroscientists’ findings leave even a simpler causation question unanswered. We do not know 
whether the offenders’ brains caused them to commit their crimes or, rather, whether the offenders’ 
criminal activity or their time in prison caused the physical abnormalities in their brains. Without 
knowing the answer to this, and other related questions, the provocative science cannot shed too 
bright of a light on the legal questions, let alone answer them. In fact, science alone cannot answer 
these legal questions. Science is amoral. It can only provide us with additional factual information 
that one can use in deciding these very difficult legal questions. 
 
The Characteristics of Punishment 
Beyond assessing which groups of offenders are ineligible for particular punishments, the 
Court has also been concerned about the constitutionality of certain types and methods of 
punishment. For example, the Trop Court struck down the punishment of denationalization 
because, “more primitive than torture, . . . [the punishment] destroys for the individual the political 
existence that was centuries in the development”—it strips the “expatriate [of his] right to have 
rights.”38 However, despite the fact that the punishment of death is generally thought to be more 
severe than denationalization—a reality acknowledged by the Trop majority39—the Court has 
 
37 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 33, at 181 (“[U]nless neuroscience demonstrates that no one is capable of minimal 
rationality—a wildly implausible scenario—fundamental criteria for [legal] responsibility will be intact.”). 
38 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
39 See id. at 99 (“Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the penalty of 
denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime.” (emphasis added)). 





repeatedly refused to strike down capital punishment as unconstitutional.40 This is a result of the 
punishment’s entrenchment in both American history and the U.S. Constitution itself.41  
The Court has commented on particular methods of execution, however. It has explained 
that methods of execution have generally evolved over time as states have applied new science 
and technology to create more humane punishments. At the time of the country’s founding, 
hanging was the ordinary mode of carrying out executions. This method was thought to be “more 
humane than some of the punishments of the Old World,” although “it was no guarantee of a quick 
and painless death.”42 Firing squads were also used during this time.43 “Through much of the 19th 
century, States experimented with technological innovations aimed at making [executions—
particularly hangings—] less painful.”44 Toward the end of the century, in seeking out “the most 
humane and practical method known to modern science,” the State of New York settled on 
electrocution.45 Several other states followed, also adopting electrocution. About half a century 
later, also perhaps in pursuit of “the most humane manner known to modern science,” Nevada 
adopted a new method of execution: lethal gas.46 Again, other states followed suit. Well into the 
 
40 See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1122 (2019) (“The Constitution allows capital punishment.”); 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732–33 (2015) (“[B]ecause it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional, 
it necessarily follows that there must be a constitutional means of carrying it out.” (internal quotations and 
alterations omitted)); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“We begin with the principle, settled 
by Gregg, that capital punishment is constitutional.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (“We now hold 
that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”). 
41 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (referencing “capital . . . crime[s]”); see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (“The death 
penalty was an accepted punishment at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.”); Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 168–87. 
42 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1124. 
43 See Deborah W. Denno, The Firing Squad As “A Known and Available Alternative Method of Execution” Post-
Glossip, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 778 (2016) (“Along with hanging, the firing squad is this country’s oldest 
method of execution.”). 
44 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1124. 
45 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890). As Professor Deborah Denno has pointed out, though, “[c]ompelling 
evidence suggests that the [decision] was influenced heavily by a financial competition between Thomas Edison and 
George Westinghouse concerning whose current would dominate the electrical industry: Edison’s DC current or 
Westinghouse’s AC current.” Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox 
Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us., 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 72 (2002). 
46 State v. Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1923). 





twentieth century, states carried out their executions using a variety of these techniques, including 
hanging, firing squad, electrocution, and lethal gas. By the 1970s, though, there were concerns 
about the barbarity of various execution methods like electrocution and gas. Further, maintaining 
electric chairs and gas chambers had become expensive. Spurred by these considerations, an 
Oklahoma state senator asked Dr. Jay Chapman, the state medical examiner, and Dr. Stanley 
Deutsch, the University of Oklahoma College of Medicine’s Anesthesiology Department 
chairman, to investigate an intravenous method of execution.47 Dr. Chapman and Dr. Deutsch then 
advised on the particular drugs to use, with Dr. Deutsch concluding that “[w]ithout question this 
is . . . extremely humane in comparison to either electrocution or execution by the inhalation of 
poisonous gases.”48 Based on this proposal, Oklahoma, and then other states, soon adopted lethal 
injection as their primary method of execution, and this remains the primary mode of execution in 
the United States today.  
Thus far, the Court has not found any method of execution to violate the Eighth 
Amendment. The Court has stated that it has specifically upheld death by firing squad and 
electrocution, although close readings of the relevant cases create questions about the precedential 
value of these holdings.49   
 
47 See Denno, supra note 45, at 95; Josh Sanburn, Creator of Lethal Injection Method: “I Don’t See Anything That Is 
More Humane,” TIME, May 15, 2014, https://time.com/101143/lethal-injection-creator-jay-chapman-botched-
executions/. 
48 Denno, supra note 45, at 95 n.207 (quoting the February 29, 1977, letter from Senator Bill Dawson to Dr. 
Deutsch); Sanburn, supra note 47. 
49 See Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1123–24 (referencing the In re Kemmler and Wilkerson v. Utah decisions); Denno, 
supra note 43, at 761–62 (suggesting that the Court did not uphold the methods of electrocution and firing squad 
under the Eighth Amendment in In re Kemmler and Wilkerson v. Utah). 





In recent years, the Court has focused on the cruelty involved in lethal injection.50 Over the 
past decade or so, the Court has decided three cases on the topic. In Baze v. Rees,51 the Court 
upheld the then-popular three-drug protocol—consisting of injecting the offender with sodium 
thiopental, then pancuronium bromide, and finally potassium chloride—for carrying out 
executions. In Glossip v. Gross,52 the Court denied a preliminary injunction request to stop an 
execution using midazolam, rather than sodium thiopental, as the first drug in the three-drug 
protocol. And in Bucklew v. Precythe,53 the Court upheld a single-drug lethal injection protocol 
using only the sedative pentobarbital.54 In each of these cases, the Court has made clear that, at 
least today, the death penalty is generally a constitutional punishment. But there could be instances 
where the punishment is carried out in such a way that renders it unconstitutional. In particular, 
the Court has been focused on the pain, or the risk of pain, involved in these executions.  
The Baze plurality explained that, for a method of lethal injection to violate the Eighth 
Amendment, “there must be a substantial risk of serious harm” that is “objectively intolerable.”55 
A petitioner could potentially establish this by suggesting an alternative method of execution—
one that is “feasible, readily implemented, and . . . significantly reduce[s] [the] substantial risk of 
severe pain.”56 Piggybacking on Baze, the Glossip Court explained that a petitioner may prevail 
on his claim that a method of execution is unconstitutional only if he can “establish[] that the 
 
50 The Court and commentators often refer to the various “methods” of carrying out lethal injection. Because lethal 
injection is a “method” of execution, though, the various ways of carrying it out are perhaps better referred to as 
“techniques.” See William W. Berry III & Meghan J. Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
403, 411 (2017).  
51 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
52 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
53 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
54 Bucklew was actually an as-applied challenge to the execution protocol in question. See generally id. (explaining 
that Bucklew “accept[ed] . . . that the State’s lethal injection protocol [was] constitutional in most applications” but 
argued that, “because of his unusual medical condition, . . .  the protocol [was] unconstitutional as applied to him”). 
55 Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (internal quotations omitted). 
56 Id. at 52 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 





State’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain” and “that the risk is 
substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives.”57 The Bucklew Court pushed 
this even further, emphasizing that it is the petitioner’s burden in every method-of-execution case 
to propose an alternative method of execution and clarifying that the petitioner also bears the 
burden of establishing that the alternative can be readily implemented.58 Despite the state having 
already statutorily adopted the petitioner’s proposed alternative of execution by lethal gas in 
Bucklew,59 the Court concluded that the petitioner had failed this test because he had not provided 
details about the necessary concentration of the gas, its administration, and the like.60 (Never mind 
that the state would have better access to this information, especially considering that Bucklew 
was in prison.61) 
As with the characteristics of an offender, like his competency or culpability, science can 
potentially tell us something about the pain associated with particular punishments. With respect 
to the death penalty, for example, science can potentially provide us with information about how 
the deadly drugs are administered, how they interact in a person’s body, and even the meaning of 
a defendant’s outward reactions to the drugs. In Glossip, the Court took something of an 
uncharacteristically deep dive into the state’s use of midazolam as the first drug in its three-drug 
 
57 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51–52). 
58 See Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1129. 
59 See MO. REV. STAT. § 546.720 (2007) (“The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by the 
administration of lethal gas or by means of the administration of lethal injection.”); see also Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 
1142 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Bucklew identified as an alternative method of execution the use of nitrogen hypoxia, 
which is a form of execution by lethal gas. Missouri law permits the use of this method of execution. Three other 
States—Alabama, Mississippi, and Oklahoma—have specifically authorized nitrogen hypoxia as a method of 
execution.” (internal citations omitted)). 
60 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737; see also Garrett Epps, Unusual Cruelty at the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC, Apr. 4, 
2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/bucklew-v-precythe-supreme-court-turns-cruelty/586471/ 
(criticizing the Bucklew Court for placing this burden on the petitioner). 
61 See Epps, supra note 60 (“This seems like a questionable assignment of the burden—an indigent inmate, locked 
24 hours a day in a solitary cell, has fewer means of acquiring information than the state does.”); cf. Berry & Ryan, 
supra note 50, at 427 (making this same point regarding the burden of establishing a substantial risk of serious 
harm). 





lethal injection protocol. It ultimately found that midazolam “can render a person insensate to 
pain” and was thus sufficient to meet Eighth Amendment requirements.62 In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority emphasized that it owed deference to the district court and that the 
petitioner bore the burden to present evidence that midazolam (in the relevant dose) could not 
sufficiently render someone insensate to pain—at least so much so that the Eighth Amendment 
was violated. Even the Glossip Court recognized, though, that it lacked the expertise to properly 
assess the science in this arena. In fact, there is a pressing need for further scientific research and 
study about the interactions and effects of these drugs in humans.  
Concentrating the Eighth Amendment analysis on pain poses several additional difficulties. 
First, we currently do not have a good way to measure pain. And, even if we did, at what point 
would a particular amount of pain—or the risk of that pain—become so severe that Eighth 
Amendment protection is warranted? And is it an individual’s subjective experience of pain or an 
objective measure of pain that matters in the Eighth Amendment calculus? Indeed, one individual 
may suffer significant pain as a result of the same treatment that causes very little pain to someone 
else. Although we know little about pain, we do know—from experience—that pain is subjective. 
Neuroscience could have a role to play here. Although we are still waiting on even more 
robust useful information in this area, the field could have much to say about how much pain an 
individual is experiencing. Through measuring blood-oxygen levels in different parts of the brain, 
which experts correlate with neural activity,63 fMRI could reveal how different punishments 
activate different parts of the brain and the level of intensity involved. Research into the “pain 
 
62 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741. 
63 See Owen D. Jones et. al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 5, 17 (2009). 





center” of the brain, which at least one expert has pinpointed as the dorsal posterior insula,64 could 
help experts assess and scale this pain. Of course difficulties with this project abound. For example, 
does increased activity in this part of the brain indicate increased pain or, rather, could a lower 
level of activity suggest that the subject has become conditioned to pain and thus the pain does not 
register as well in the dorsal posterior insula or other areas of the brain? Again, questions also arise 
about whether a particular offender’s pain matters or whether the average pain of an individual 
subjected to a punishment should be what counts. 
Another problem with the Court’s focus on pain in its method-of-execution cases is related 
to the multiple layers of secrecy shrouding today’s executions.65 First, in contrast to the historical 
public spectacle of executions, modern executions are generally kept hidden from the public. Only 
a small number of invited observers may be present. Second, states often refuse to disclose the 
identities of their executioners, the drugs used to carry out lethal injections, and the manufacturers 
of those drugs. Third, where states still use a paralytic in their execution protocols, this drug hides 
the effects of the lethal cocktail on the person being executed by preventing the individual from 
screaming or writhing like might otherwise occur. These many layers of secrecy work to inhibit 
further understanding about the painful effects of the lethal injection protocol, as well as the 
associated risks of causing pain, that could result from an executioner’s lack of skill or experience, 
sloppy manufacturing practices and loose governing regulations, or the potency of the drugs 
themselves. 
Certainly, more information related to the particulars of execution methods and techniques 
is important to providing content to the Court’s standards set forth in Baze, Glossip, and Bucklew, 
 
64 See Andrew R. Segerdahl et al., The Dorsal Posterior Insula Subserves a Fundamental Role in Human Pain, 18 
NATURE NEUROSCI. 499–500 (2015). But see Karen D. Davis et al., Evidence Against Pain Specificity in the Dorsal 
Posterior Insula, F1000RESEARCH (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4566284/. 
65 See Berry & Ryan, supra note 50, at 422–25 (outlining these layers of secrecy). 





but obtaining reliable data is difficult in this area. There is not enough research on the bodily effects 
of the drugs and dosages used in lethal injections today. In part, there is not a significant market 
for deadly drugs used in humans that would drive research in this area. More importantly, though, 
there are significant ethical constraints on conducting this type of research. In most circumstances, 
one cannot ethically enroll human subjects to participate in a study about the extent to which 
injecting them with deadly drugs at lethal dosages causes pain. As additional executions are carried 
out using a particular technique, at least some data on the pain associated with these executions 
could multiply, but state secrecy related to executions will hamper this effect. 
As with other areas of the law, injecting science into Eighth Amendment analyses can 
perhaps lead to more informed judgment about whether punishments—or even bail or fines—are 
unconstitutional. However, science can provide only the data and not conclusions about legal 
questions. As the Court attempts to buttress new Eighth Amendment decisions with science, it will 
have to confront additional difficult legal questions, particularly questions dealing with the 
objectivity versus subjectivity of brain structure and function, pharmacological effects in the body, 
and experiences of pain.  
 
Data and Statistics 
Beyond science related to the offenders and punishments themselves, perhaps the richest 
source for more informed Eighth Amendment decision-making lies in broader troves of data and 
statistical analyses of that data. In recent years, there has been an explosion in the government’s 
and others’ formal use of data to inform important decisions. For example, online platforms like 
Facebook and Google employ user data to target advertisements to individuals most likely to be 
interested in the product. The medical industry uses data to improve treatment outcomes. And 





judges in the criminal justice system often use data-powered algorithms to make more consistent 
decisions about bail, sentencing, and parole. Greater access to data and more prolific use of it could 
be used to help decide Eighth Amendment questions as well. For example, one could employ 
statistical analyses to conduct more robust studies about the deterrent value of various 
punishments. One could dig into data related to the effectiveness of rehabilitative efforts inside 
and outside of prisons. And better information about the role that prejudices—on race, sex, 
religion, ethnicity, or other factors—play in sentencing outcomes could help answer questions 
about whether punishments are imposed in an unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious fashion. 
Historically, though, the Court has not relied too heavily on data and statistics. In the Fourth 
Amendment context, for example, the Court generally does not look to data or statistics on popular 
conceptions of privacy when assessing the reasonableness of searches or seizures and, relatedly, 
“reasonable expectations of privacy.”66 In the Eighth Amendment context, the Court similarly has 
been hesitant to rely on data and statistics in its decision-making. To be sure, the Court often 
examines how many jurisdictions have accepted or rejected a practice in determining the 
constitutionality of a punishment, but several Justices and commentators have characterized the 
Court’s state-counting in this regard as anything but scientific.67 When invited to decide Eighth 
Amendment cases based on other types of data, the Court has been less hospitable to such an 
approach.68 
 
66 See Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. 849, 851, 867 (2014). 
67 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court’s evidence 
regarding state-counting as “flims[y]”); Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit 
Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 588 n.115 (2010) (noting “the 
Court’s inconsistency in its counting practices”); Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 552 (2005) (referencing the Court’s “creative jurisdiction counts”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 18–19. 
68 But see CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM 10 
(2005) (pointing out the prominent role of social science in the various Justices’ opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)). 





In McCleskey v. Kemp,69 the Court explained the shortcomings of statistics in establishing 
that the death penalty was applied in a discriminatory way such that it violated the Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendments. When the petitioner alleged that his death sentence was imposed in a 
discriminatory fashion—because a statistical study showed, for example, “that black defendants, 
such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death 
penalty”70—the Court rejected the persuasive value of the statistical evidence.71 It explained that 
the statistics failed to prove intent to discriminate, as they did not provide evidence of intent to 
discriminate in McCleskey’s specific case. Although in some contexts the Court has allowed 
statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination to establish such intent, the McCleskey 
Court indicated that the capital context is different, because a uniquely composed jury, considering 
a variety of factors, makes each capital decision on an individualized basis. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that “the application of an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific 
decision in a trial and sentencing simply is not” dispositive in these cases.72  
While these arguments might be relevant to the equal protection issue, one might have 
expected the statistical study in McCleskey to have greater impact on the Eighth Amendment 
decision, considering that, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court had struck down capital punishment 
as applied throughout the United States because it was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.73 Yet, when facing the Eighth Amendment question, the McCleskey Court again found 
the statistics unpersuasive. The Court explained that the cases resurrecting capital punishment after 
Furman allowed for, indeed even required, guided discretion for juries making capital sentencing 
 
69 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
70 Id. at 311. 
71 For the purpose of its analysis, though, the McCleskey Court assumed that the statistical study at issue was 
methodologically sound. See id. at 291 n.7. 
72 Id. at 294. 
73 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE 
SCIENCE AND THE LAW 259–60 (2004); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 





decisions. Not only is some measure of discretion necessary in these cases, the Court continued, 
but also it is often advantageous for defendants. The Court pointed out that the statistical study did 
not “prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in 
McCleskey’s particular case.”74 “At most,” the Court said, “the . . . study indicate[d] a discrepancy 
that appears to correlate with race.”75 The Court conceded that the statistics suggested “some risk 
of racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision in a criminal case.”76 However, the Court explained 
that such risks, as well as “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing,” are inevitable where jury 
discretion is involved.77 “The question,” the Court said, “is at what point that risk becomes 
constitutionally unacceptable.”78 The Court found that this was not the case here, and it 
emphasized that the data did not demonstrate the type of “major systemic defects” that led to the 
Eighth Amendment violation in Furman.79 Moreover, accepting the petitioner’s argument 
condemning the discretion that contributed to any disparities in sentencing would be “antithetical 
to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal justice system,” the Court said.80 Adopting 
such a position could completely undermine the entire system. 
Even though there has been a recent explosion of available criminal justice data—some 
that could perhaps inform Eighth Amendment decision-making—the Court has not rushed to 
embrace what statistical studies might suggest about various punishments and their 
constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment. Although this information could contribute to 
assessments about, for example, the true deterrence value of a punishment or the effect of a 
 
74 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308. 
75 Id. at 312. 
76 Id. at 308. 
77 Id. at 312. 
78 Id. at 308–09. Moreover, in a later case, the Court reminded us that, even if statistics can provide insight to the 
risk of harm, the petitioner must also establish that the risk of harm is one that society will not tolerate—it is “so 
grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). 
79 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313. 
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defendant’s race on sentencing, it has had little direct impact thus far. Paying attention to these 
studies could potentially build the foundation for a more evidence-based Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, but of course understanding the many nuances and full implications of these studies 
poses a challenge. The Court will likely have to wrestle with such information and the challenges 
that come along with it sometime soon. 
 
The Court’s Competency with Science 
A significant hurdle to the Court’s reliable and accurate use of science and data in its Eighth 
Amendment cases is the Justices’ general lack of fluency with these materials. The Justices have 
historically had difficulty understanding some of the science-based issues that have been relevant 
in a handful of the cases before them. For example, in the 2010 case of City of Ontario, California 
v. Quon,81 a couple of the Justices demonstrated their lack of understanding of pager and text 
technologies. In oral arguments addressing a civil rights complaint against the city wherein a police 
officer asserted that his department’s review of his text messages violated the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, the Justices asked several questions to better 
understand the technology.82 Chief Justice Roberts asked: “Maybe—maybe everybody else knows 
this, but what is the difference between a pager and e-mail?”83 Justice Kennedy asked what would 
happen if someone were to send a text message to an individual while he was texting with someone 
else: Does the individual have “a voice mail saying that your call is very important to us; we’ll get 
back to you?”84 These somewhat humorous questions take on a very serious tenor if a lack of 
 
81 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
82 See Ryan, supra note 66, at 884 (relating some of the Justices’ questions from oral argument). 
83 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (No. 08-1332), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2009/08-1332.pdf. 
84 Id. at 44. 





understanding about science or technology can affect life-and-death decisions as is often the case 
in the Eighth Amendment context. For example, Justice Powell—the author of the McCleskey 
opinion—admitted to his biographer that he did not understand statistics very well.85 And one 
commentator has said that “it [is] clear from [Justice Powell’s] opinions that he had no interest in 
obtaining any [such understanding].”86 Is it possible that, had Justice Powell and his colleagues 
better understood the statistical study introduced in that case, McCleskey’s life would have been 
spared?87 A lack of scientific competency by the Court leaves a disquieting fog about whether a 
better understanding of the science could have caused the Court to reach a different conclusion. 
Even when the Court has given greater credence to the science, though—as in Roper, 
Graham, and Miller, where the Court relied on psychology and neuroscience—there are still 
questions about the appropriateness of the Court’s actions. For example, in Roper, Justice Scalia 
pointed out that the majority relied on “scientific and sociological studies, picking and choosing 
those that support[ed] its position,” but “[i]t never explain[ed] why those particular studies are 
methodologically sound,” and “none [of them] was ever entered into evidence or tested in an 
adversarial proceeding.”88 And in Graham, Justice Thomas, while not entirely convinced that the 
Court’s reliance on “developments in psychology and brain science” was appropriate, accused the 
Court of “misstat[ing] the data on which it relie[d].”89 Further, he explained that scientific evidence 
does not support the moral conclusion that forms the Court’s independent judgment. Whether a 
lack of competency with science could cause the Justices to overlook relevant information or 
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whether it might steer the Court in the wrong direction, a lack of scientific understanding could 
lead to questionable or even erroneous Eighth Amendment outcomes. 
Perhaps the biggest effect of the Justices’ lack of competency and resulting lack of 
confidence with science is its regular deference to state legislatures and lower courts on these 
scientific matters. With regard to insanity and intellectual disability, for example, the Court has 
historically left it to the various jurisdictions to define these terms, leaving the Court’s 
determinations that insane and intellectually disabled persons cannot constitutionally be executed 
as hollower promises than they could be. The Court has somewhat rectified this possible misstep 
in recent cases, though, outlining some minimal requirements at least for jurisdictions’ definitions 
of intellectual disability.90 Another example of the Court providing significant deference to lower 
courts can be seen in the Glossip decision’s reliance on the district court’s assessment of whether 
the use of midazolam in its three-drug lethal injection cocktail created a substantial risk of severe 
pain. The Court justified this deference not only by the standard of review generally accorded to 
lower court factual determinations but also by explaining that “federal courts should not embroil 
themselves in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.”91 Unfortunately for the 
petitioner, this also led the Court to require the petitioner to bear the burden of establishing a 
substantial risk of severe pain.92 Overall, this deference to legislatures on the science underlying 
the Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions creates concerns about a lack of uniformity in some 
Eighth Amendment baseline for punishments and also the risk of the Court creating powerful 
precedential case law based upon erroneous fact-finding.  
 
 
90 See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). 
91 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2740 (2015); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion) 
(referring to the problem of “embroil[ing] the courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise”). 
92 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2740. 





A Changing Landscape 
 The Eighth Amendment landscape is ripe for change. As the Court has made clear, the 
meaning of the Amendment shifts as society evolves. And society is regularly undergoing 
significant transformation, especially today when advances in science and technology are 
accelerating at an astonishing pace. Science and the information it produces can create change by 
facilitating greater understanding of offenders and punishments and also by affecting the 
mechanics of punishment practices. Further, science can help measure societal change. Fully 
understanding the changes that science precipitates, or even measures, is a challenge. Generally 
untrained in the various scientific disciplines, the Supreme Court Justices, and judges in general, 
are confronted with the difficult task of attempting to understand this new information and its 
implications for important questions like the constitutionality of bail, fines, and punishments under 
the Eighth Amendment. Although the Court has not, in recent years, squarely faced a head-on 
challenge with data like it did in McCleskey, our dynamic societal landscape and changing 
punishment practices may require the Court to more directly wrestle with these knotty issues 
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